Summary

Philosopher Moti Gorin asks what gender medicine for young people is meant to achieve. The original Dutch treatment plan aimed to improve young people's mental and physical health. But reviews in England, Sweden and Finland found the evidence for those benefits is weak. Some ethicists, notably Florence Ashley, now argue that blockers, hormones and surgery are justified by patients' wishes for their bodies and their right to choose, not by health gains. Gorin argues this clashes with medicine's duty to do no harm. A patient's right to choose means choosing between options doctors can justify, not demanding any treatment they want. He concludes that serious treatments for minors need good evidence that benefits outweigh risks. This is a philosophical argument, not new data. He admits it mostly argues against a view, and the journal published several critical replies.

Key findings

• 美國的指引支持對有性別困擾的年輕人使用青春期阻斷劑、跨性別荷爾蒙和手術，但英格蘭、瑞典和芬蘭在審查發現益處的證據薄弱後已經縮回。
• 開啟青少年過渡的最初荷蘭研究有嚴重缺陷：沒有對照組、衡量性別困擾的方法有缺陷，而且患者與今天所見的非常不同。
• 一些倫理學家主張，年輕人應該有權根據自己的身體目標和選擇自由獲得這些治療，不需要心理健康益處的證明，甚至不需要診斷。
• Gorin 主張，這與醫學不傷害的基本義務衝突：僅僅想要改變身體，在沒有證據顯示對健康有幫助的情況下，並不足以成為有風險的治療的理由。
• 他說各國之間有差異，部分是因為對證據的判斷不同（仔細的系統性回顧對比較寬鬆的專家摘要），部分是因為對醫學應該改善健康還是滿足認同目標存在分歧。

Abstract

The original “Dutch Protocol”—the treatment model comprised of puberty blockers, cross-sex hormones, and surgery—was intended to improve the mental and physical health of pediatric patients experiencing distress over their sexed bodies. Consequently, both researchers and clinicians have couched eligibility for treatment and measures of treatment efficacy in terms of the interventions’ effects on outcomes such as gender dysphoria, depression, anxiety, and suicide. However, recent systematic reviews have concluded that the scientific evidence supporting these interventions is uncertain, leading to significant international differences in what treatments are offered to youth. Against this backdrop, a different argumentative approach has emerged in support of gender-affirming care. This approach appeals not to reductions in patient morbidity or mortality but to patient autonomy, where medical intervention is pursued as a means to the satisfaction of a patient's “embodiment goals.” In this article, I raise objections to autonomy-based justifications for pediatric gender-affirming care, concluding that these arguments misunderstand the place of autonomy in clinical decision-making and, consequently, put patients at risk of medical harm.

Conclusion

This article argues that the autonomy-based view—according to which medical interventions for gender dysphoria in youth ought to be guided by patients' embodiment goals rather than measurable health outcomes—is misguided, as it conflicts with medicine's long-standing commitment to nonmaleficence. The author contends that transition-related medical treatments for youth are justified only if there is good evidence of a favorable risk-benefit profile in terms of measurable health outcomes; an adolescent's desire to obtain particular sex characteristics is not sufficient to establish a right to such interventions. The author critiques consequentialist arguments (including those appealing to gender euphoria, creative transfiguration, dehumanization, and social marginalization) and autonomy-based arguments (including the right to an open future and an analogy to reproductive healthcare), finding them all insufficient to justify departure from the traditional medical aim of protecting and promoting patient health. The practical upshot is that, absent compelling reasons to abandon this commitment, the medical profession should reaffirm that serious medical interventions require strong evidence of a favorable risk-benefit profile for treating physical and psychiatric morbidity and relieving suffering. The author acknowledges the limitation that this article is largely negative and does not fully articulate a positive philosophical account of health or the aims of medicine, but hopes to have surfaced conceptual and moral tensions in contemporary pediatric gender medicine.